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Converging evidence highlights the relevance of embodied cognition in learning
processes. In this study we evaluate whether embodied action (enaction) improves
cognitive understanding in children. Using the Piagetian conservation tasks in 6–7
year olds, we analyzed quantity conservation conceptualization in children who were
active participants in the transformation process and compared these results to those
of children who were mere observers of an adult’s demonstration (as traditionally
conducted). The investigation was performed with 105 first-graders. Conservation tasks
were demonstrated to half the children, while the other half actively carried out the
transformation of matter. Our findings showed that active manipulation of the material
helped children recognize quantity invariance in a higher proportion than when the
demonstration was only observed. That is, their enactive experience enabled them to
comprehend conservation phenomena more easily than if they were merely passive
observers. The outcome of this research thus emphasizes how active participation
benefits cognitive processes in learning contexts, promoting autonomy, and agency
during childhood.
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INTRODUCTION
Numerous studies have emphasized the importance of embodied action in cognitive processing
both in children and adults (e.g., Varela et al., 1991; Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Lakoff and Johnson,
1999; Thompson and Varela, 2001; Sommerville et al., 2005; Johnson and Rohrer, 2007; Glenberg,
2010; Witherington and Heying, 2013). The embodied cognition theory considers cognition as
lived, enacted and closely intertwined with dynamic contexts (Varela, 2000; Thompson, 2007). This
approach, which prioritizes the role of agency, considers cognition to be a consequence of active
manipulation (e.g., Varela, 1999; Di Paolo et al., 2010). Thus, cognition results from sensory-motor
experience, where action influences perception and vice versa, indicating that perception and action
are inseparable (Prinz, 1990, 1997; Varela et al., 1991; Thelen and Smith, 1994; Jeannerod, 2001;
Wilson, 2002; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Witherington, 2007, 2011; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008;
Di Paolo et al., 2010; Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012; Anderson et al., 2013). In line with this, it
has been stated that conceptual knowledge is embodied, and therefore grounded in sensory-motor
systems (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). To sumup, the embodied approach considers perception, action
and cognition as tightly linked, and that previous sensorimotor experiences are seen as the basis of
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knowledge. It is therefore highly likely that first-person action
improves conceptual understanding. In this investigation we
evaluate how action promotes conceptual understanding.
One precursor of this view was Jean Piaget, who proposed
that knowledge is linked to experience and demonstrated the
crucial role of recurrent sensorimotor activity in developmental
cognitive processes (Piaget, 1952). Piaget’s huge contribution to
child development showed that cognition is grounded in concrete
activity, a theory he developed by studying how children shape
their world throughout ontogeny through sensorimotor action
(e.g., Piaget, 1952, 1971). Amongst his multiple contributions,
Piaget found that understanding of the invariance principle, i.e.,
the logical concept of quantity conservation, is a developmental
process that occurs between 5 and 8 years of age (Piaget,
1965, 1971). Piaget and other investigators applied a series of
tasks in which children observed, then evaluated, whether a
certain quantity remained the same when changes in visual
appearance were introduced, even though nothing was added
or removed (e.g., Piaget, 1971; Inhelder et al., 1974; McGarrigle
and Donaldson, 1974; Wilkening, 1979; Alibali and Kita, 2010;
Goldin-Meadow and Beilock, 2010; Ping and Goldin-Meadow,
2010). Thus, children’s ability to understand conservation despite
the apparent transformation of number, matter, or liquid
quantity was analyzed. These conservation tasks are ideal for
the evaluation of cognitive development, given that they are
controllable, replicable and easy to apply in different cultures
and socio-economic contexts. In addition, the results are easily
measurable and these tests are therefore highly suitable for the
assessment of the role of action in children’s comprehension.
Tasks consisted of showing a child an initial stage (e.g., pouring
the same amount of liquid into two identical containers), then
a transformation process demonstration (e.g., pouring the same
amount of liquid into two different containers, so that quantities
appeared to be different), and finally the child was asked
whether the amount was the same as before, or different. The
transformation processes involved the researcher, for example,
flattening a ball of clay, stretching out a row of coins, or
transferring a certain amount of liquid into a narrower or wider
container.
According to Piaget (1965) and other researchers (e.g.,
Smedslund, 1968; Siegler, 1981; Alibali and Kita, 2010; Goldin-
Meadow and Beilock, 2010; Ping and Goldin-Meadow, 2010;
Houdé et al., 2011) children under 5–7 years old have difficulty
understanding the conservation principle, whereas children older
than 7–8 are generally capable of realizing that number, length,
volume of liquid, and matter remain unchanged in spite of
changes in form. Therefore, for the above situations, three
developmental stages are expected to exist within the 5–8 age
range: children who consistently recognize the conservation
principle (Total Conservers, TC), those who partially recognize
this concept (Partial Conservers, PC) and children who do
not recognize it in any task (Non Conservers, NC). Children
go through a transition stage of being “partial conservers” for
liquid quantity, mass, number, and length (Church and Goldin-
Meadow, 1986). Recognition of weight conservation occurs at
9–10 years of age, and 11–12 year-olds are able to understand
volume conservation (Piaget, 1963). In relation to children’s
increased understanding of the conservation principle, a recent
study on number conservation showed that certain neural
networks associated with numerical and executive functions were
not activated in 5–6 year-old children (non-conservers) whereas
in children older than 9–10 (conservers) these networks were
activated (Houdé et al., 2011). These authors suggested that
the neural contribution of this bilateral parietofrontal network,
associated with executive functions such as inhibitory control,
plays a crucial role in the acquisition of number-conservation
(Borst et al., 2012, 2013; Houdé and Borst, 2014).
Most previous studies on this subject analyzed the
conservation principle in a situation where children observed
the experimenter’s demonstration (e.g., Piaget, 1965, 1971;
Inhelder et al., 1974; McGarrigle and Donaldson, 1974;
Wilkening, 1979; Goldin-Meadow and Beilock, 2010; Ping
and Goldin-Meadow, 2010). These demonstrations precluded
the possibility of enaction on the part of participants, who
remained “passive,” i.e., they were not active agents. Following
the enactive theory that action modifies perception, thus
promoting further understanding, we considered that it would
be of interest to explore whether active manipulation enhances
conceptual understanding in children. In the present study we
evaluate the role of hands-on experience in cognitive processing,
hypothesizing that action will contribute to understanding of the
conservation principle, analyzed by means of the well-known
Piagetian conservation tasks, but with one major change:
the addition of active manipulation. By giving participants
the opportunity to handle the materials, we will be able to
compare in a precise, concrete way, children’s recognition of
the conservation concept with and without the incorporation of
action. That is, conceptual understanding will be assessed under
two conditions: action and observation. Seven conservation
tasks were devised using the Piagetian conservation tasks with
6–7 year olds, an age considered to be in the mid-range of
this developmental process. We will test the hypothesis that
when children are active participants in the transformation
process, i.e., the act of transferring liquids, flattening a ball
of plasticine, moving coins, or measuring strings with their
own hands, conservation understanding is increased. Thus,
we hypothesize that children’s embodied action will help them
to recognize quantity invariance in a higher proportion than




The study was carried out with 105 first-graders from public and
private schools in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina (54 girls, 51
boys). The age range of participants was 6–7 years (mean age: 6
years, 8 months±0.6).
The participants were all in good health, and there were
no significant differences in body mass index or socioeconomic
level. Experiments were conducted according to the Helsinki
declaration and approved by the Clinical Research Ethics
Committee (CEIC) and by the Council of Education of Río
Negro Province, Argentina. All procedures were carried out with
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the adequate understanding and written consent of parents and
school authorities. In addition, the children gave their verbal
consent for participation in the study.
Procedure
During a normal school day, one child at a time participated in an
experimental session of approximately 20–30min. Two different
procedures were followed, corresponding to an observation
condition (N = 47, 25 girls, and 22 boys) and an action condition
(N = 58, 29 girls and 29 boys). In each first grade, approximately
half of the children were randomly assigned to each condition.
Children worked individually in a quiet room in the school.
Each participant was told that he/she was going to play some
games, and sat at a table, facing the researcher. The quantity
conservation task materials were laid out on the table. Each
sessionwas recorded.We analyzed each answer per task per child,
for both groups.
Action and Observation Conditions
Action Condition
In this condition the researcher, with speech and gestures, asked
each child to carry out the seven Piagetian conservation tasks by
themselves. The tasks were shown in the following order: Two
liquid quantity tasks, two mass quantity tasks, a number task and
two length tasks. Each task consisted of three stages: Sameness,
changing and judgment stages.
1. In the liquid quantity task, the researcher instructed the
child to pour the same amount of liquid into two identical
containers in order to obtain equal quantities in each one.
Each child was asked to make sure that both containers
held the same amount of liquid. In the changing stage, the
researcher instructed the child to pour the liquid from one of
the two identical containers into a narrower one. Finally, in the
judgment stage, the researcher asked the child if the quantities
were the same or different, and why (“Can you say why you
think they are the same/different?”).
2. The first stage of Task 1 was repeated but in the changing stage
the researcher instructed the child to pour the liquid from
one of the two identical containers into a much narrower one
(narrower than in the changing stage of 1). In the judgment
stage, the questions were repeated as for 1.
3. In the mass quantity task, the researcher instructed the child
to form two identical balls (i.e., with the same amount of
plasticine) and each child was asked to make sure the two
forms had the same amount of matter. In the changing stage,
the researcher instructed the child to roll the plasticine into
a thinner, longer shape. In the judgment stage, the questions
were repeated as for 1.
4. The first stage of Task 3 was repeated but in the changing
stage the researcher instructed the child to flatten the ball and
stretch it; in the judgment stage, the questions were repeated
as for 1.
5. In the number task, the researcher instructed the child to
arrange 20 coins in two rows of 10. Each child was asked
to make sure the two rows had the same number of coins.
In the changing stage, the researcher instructed the child to
spread out the coins in the upper row. These instructions were
accompanied with gestures for clarity. In the judgment stage,
the questions were repeated as for 1.
6. In the length task, the researcher instructed the child to lay
out two identical strings in a straight line in front of him/her,
parallel to each other and to the edge of the table. Each child
was asked tomake sure the two strings were identical in length.
In the changing stage, the researcher asked the child to move
the upper string 20–30 cm to the right of its original location.
In the judgment stage, the researcher asked the child if both
strings were the same length and asked: “If an ant has to walk
along both strings, will it travel the same distance on each?
Will it take the same or a different number of steps?” and also
asked why.
7. The first stage of Task 6 was repeated but in the changing
stage the researcher instructed the child to form a curve
with the upper string. These instructions were accompanied
with gestures for clarity. Following this, the researcher asked
questions as for 6.
Observation Condition
In this condition, the child observed demonstrations of the seven
Piagetian conservation tasks detailed above, in the same order as
in the action condition and consisting of the same three stages,
but in this case carried out by the researcher.
Data Analysis
Conservation Judgments
We analyzed children’s answers related to each task, i.e.,
if quantity remained the same or was different after the
transformation process. If a child answered that quantity was the
same, we considered this a conserver answer for that task. For
both observation and action conditions, we analyzed each child’s
judgment. Children received no feedback on their answers, i.e.,
the experimenter did not comment on the children’s responses.
Comparison of TC, PC, NC in Each Condition
If a child recognized conservation in all seven tasks, he/she
was classified as a total conserver (TC). If a child recognized
conservation in at least one task, but not in all, we considered
him/her to be a partial conserver (PC), and if a child did not
recognize conservation in any of the seven tasks, we considered
him/her a non-conserver (NC).
Statistical Analysis
Conservation Judgments
Using a chi square test (p < 0.05), we compared the proportion of
conserver responses between the action and observation groups
for each task category, taking tasks of a similar type together, i.e.,
liquid, mass, number, and length (Church and Goldin-Meadow,
1986). The conservation response was considered as accurate
(score= 1) and non-conservation as error (score= 0).
Comparison of TC, PC, NC
We compared the proportion of children who recognized
conservation in all 7 tasks (TC), those who recognized the
conservation principle in at least one task but not all (PC) and
those who did not recognize the conservation principle in any
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of the seven tasks (NC) in each group using a chi square test.
The relative proportion of TC, PC and NC between groups was
conducted by means of the difference test (p < 0.05).
RESULTS
When comparing the proportions of conservation responses
for each task category (i.e., liquid, mass, length and number),
for the action and observation groups, we found that in the
liquid quantity tasks the proportion of conservation answers was
significantly higher in the action group than in the observation
one (X2 = 5.82, p = 0.0158, df = 1). That is, the act of
transferring liquid by themselves helped the children recognize
that liquid quantity was conserved despite the change in the
container’s shape. Similarly, a higher proportion of conservation
answers was found in the action group during the mass tasks
(X2 = 10.61, p = 0.0011, df = 1), i.e., the act of flattening or
spreading out plasticine helped them recognize that there was no
change in mass despite the transformation in shape. During the
number task, the proportion of conservation answers was also
higher for the action group (X2 = 20.08, p = 0.000, df = 1).
Furthermore, the opportunity to handle the string during the
length tasks led to a greater proportion of conservation answers
in the action group than in the observation one (X2 = 23.21,
p = 0.0000, df = 1) (Figure 1). Thus, in all tasks, a higher
proportion of children who were given the opportunity to
manipulate the materials showed a greater capacity for reasoning
and discernment, which enabled their understanding of the
conservation principle. As the study progressed, an overall
increase in the proportion of conservation answers was observed
in all tasks in both groups.
When comparing the relative proportion of children who
recognized conservation in all tasks (TC), in at least one (PC),
and in none (NC), we found significant differences between the
three categories in the action group (X2 = 24.24, p = 0.0000,
df = 2). Conversely, in the observation group no significant
differences between the relative proportion of children who
FIGURE 1 | Proportion of conserver answers in the action and
observation groups for the four types of conservation tasks.
acknowledged conservation in all tasks, in at least one, and in
none (X2 = 2.85, p = 0.24, df = 2). The action group holds
a significantly higher proportion (p < 0.028) of children who
recognized conservation in all tasks (43.10%) in comparison
with the proportion found in the observation group (25.53%).
In addition, in the action group we found a significantly lower
proportion (p < 0.0001) of children who did not recognize
conservation in any task (3.45%) compared with the proportion
found in the observation group (29.79%). The extremely low
number of non-conservers in the action group shows that when
embodied action was allowed, most of the children were aware of
conservation in at least one task in a higher proportion thanwhen
they were merely observers. The relative proportions of children
who understood conservation in at least one task, but not in all,
was similar in both groups (p = 0.21) (Figure 2); this fact could
be associated with the high probability of responding correctly to
one question out of six for the seven tasks. Therefore, we consider
that the relevant finding is the higher proportion of TC found in
the action group as well as the lower proportion of NC in this
group.
DISCUSSION
The present study shows how active participation enhances
cognitive processing in 6–7 year old children. Using the
well-known Piagetian conservation tasks, we discerned that
active manipulation, as opposed to mere observation of a
demonstration carried out by a researcher, significantly increased
understanding of the conservation principle. The fact that
conservation performance was higher in the action group
than in the observation one suggests that the experience of
manipulating objects throughout the transformation processes
facilitated recognition of the conservation concept. Thus, the
experience of “doing” (i.e., being the agent) seems to favor
conceptualization of the fact that liquid quantity, mass, number,
and length can remain unaltered despite changes in appearance.
Our findings contribute to the understanding of cognition as
FIGURE 2 | Proportion of each subgroup (TC, PC, NC) in the action and
observation groups.
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actively embodied, highlighting the impact of action in learning
processes. These results suggest that education systems could
benefit from the inclusion of embodied experiences in their
teaching methods, as suggested in the past (e.g., Montessori,
1914; Dewey, 1920). Our research experimentally confirms the
proposal of these well-known educators to incorporate first-hand
experience in educational instruction (e.g., Montessori, 1914;
Dewey, 1920).
This study aimed to confirm the important role of action
in cognition. To this end, we chose to work with Piaget’s
conservation tasks, as they are well formulated and easily
applicable. We sought to evaluate whether active manipulation
influences children’s cognitive processing, and therefore in
our study children had the opportunity to perform the
tasks, thus promoting agency and autonomy. The present
work contributes to understanding of how children’s cognitive
abilities can be enhanced by active performance, favoring
children’s empowerment. Our findings are in line with recent
studies that have shown how acting out can improve abstract
comprehension of physics and mathematics (e.g., Glenberg
et al., 2012; Nemirovsky et al., 2012; Núñez, 2012) and reading
comprehension (e.g., Guan et al., 2013), highlighting how
embodied experiences promote conceptual comprehension and
rational and abstract thinking (Varela et al., 1991).
Our results agree with the embodied cognition theory which
asserts that cognitive processes emerge from perception-action
patterns, where action guides perception in local situations,
which change, in turn, as a consequence of the child’s action
(e.g., Varela, 1999; Di Paolo et al., 2010). As proposed by the
enactive theory, cognitive agents are not passive data collectors
who model the world, but active participants who enact a world
(Varela et al., 1991; Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012). Thus,
the world is not something given from outside but something
engaged in by doing; then, the world is “brought to life”
by concrete handling (Varela, 2000). Along the same lines, a
previous study comparing action and observation in conceptual
categorization in adults found that action guides object
categorization; the authors thus propose that categorization is
based on sensorimotor experience (Iachini et al., 2008). In our
investigation, the action and observation conditions also implied
different sensorimotor experiences, suggesting that increased
awareness of the invariance principle could be a result of the
children’s own activity, where feedback from their action may
change their perception of the conservation phenomenon. It is
likely that the different kinds of experience, i.e., observing or
doing, could have led to different allocation of attention. That
is, active manipulation could have helped increase attention to
the transformation processes, promoting greater awareness and
understanding. It has been proposed that concrete handling helps
one focus, and so the present moment can be more salient
when it involves concrete action (Varela, 2000). This is in line
with previous studies which proposed that lack of attention to
relevant quantitative relationships led young children to fail in
conservation awareness (e.g., Trabasso and Bower, 1968; Gelman,
1969; Miller and Heller, 1976; Gelman and Baillargeon, 1983).
When analyzing each task performance, the results showed
how children in the action group answered as conservers in all
tasks in a higher proportion than in the observation group. The
task sequence was randomly established and tasks were presented
in the same order in both groups, i.e., children underwent
the testing in identical conditions and were asked the same
questions except for the opportunity to participate actively; the
marked difference observed between groups, therefore, must
have been due to a different cognitive process occurring while the
action group performed the tasks. As the experiment progressed,
in both groups a relative increase was observed in children’s
correct total conservation answers in all tasks except for the
length one; this could indicate that generalization or learning
transfer has occurred in both conditions. However, our objective
was to compare performance under the action and observation
conditions; that is, whether the act of “doing” or “observing”
generated changes in the understanding of the conservation
principle. To this end, the same sequence was followed for
each participant and no counterbalancing of task evaluation
was carried out. Future studies could further elucidate whether
active manipulation of a certain conservation task can improve
conservation awareness of a later one, and also evaluate the
relative difficulty of each task.
As we worked with children whose age lay in the mid-
range of the conservation invariance developmental process,
it is significant that when comparing the proportion of total
conservers, partial conservers, and non-conservers, we found a
higher proportion of children in the action group who recognized
the conservation principle in all tasks and a lower proportion of
children who did not recognize quantity conservation in any task,
as hypothesized. We worked with children of 6–7 years old, but
previous research has shown that when an easier version of the
task is applied, children show the conservation principle earlier
in life (Wilkening, 1979); other studies which explored different
ways of testing conservation principle allude to potential biases
in Piagetian task methodology (e.g., McGarrigle and Donaldson,
1974) and also suggested that conservation conceptualization
could occur at earlier ages. Nevertheless, the aim of our study
is not to determine at what developmental age the conservation
principle is acquired, but rather to compare its conceptualization
in two clear-cut circumstances, one of which involved action on
the part of children while the other did not.
Other research has demonstrated that children participating
in these Piagetian tasks tend to explain the conservation concept
with both gestures and speech; these embodied gestures can help
manifest conceptual knowledge of conservation (e.g., Evans and
Rubin, 1979; Church and Goldin-Meadow, 1986; Alibali and
Kita, 2010). It has been found that gestures highlight perceptually
present information (Alibali and Kita, 2010) and that gestures
not only reflect unspoken thought but can also change thought
in children (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, 2009; Goldin-Meadow and
Beilock, 2010). These authors suggest that gestures provide
a bridge between action and abstract thought. Furthermore,
although our findings tie in well with these studies, the analysis
of gestures constitutes a different approach to the relevance of
action in cognitive processing. In a previous study researchers
explored the use of training procedures between the pretesting
and post-testing of conservation tasks in partial conservers.
Results showed that the training, which involved manipulation,
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slightly improved posttest judgment (Church and Goldin-
Meadow, 1986). In their investigation, the experimenter played
a predominant role as he/she filled the two containers with the
same quantity of liquid and then asked the child to transfer it to
different containers. This fact could explain why they observed
a much lower level of impact due to manipulation. In contrast,
our research involved no training stage and the children were
active agents of the entire process, from the beginning, without
the active participation of an adult.
In our work, the fact that children’s active experience
during the transformation process was effective in facilitating
conservation performance highlights the crucial role of agency.
This could have an impact on education, given that, as
stated by John Dewey, learning methods are generally external
to children’s existing capabilities, tending to lie beyond the
reach of their experience. As he pointed out, “traditional
teaching tends to impose from above and from outside adult
standards, subject-matter and methods, and this imposition
and external control oppose expression and cultivation of
individuality” (Dewey, 1920). Similarly, the renowned educator
Maria Montessori founded an integral pedagogy system based on
the importance of a child’s experience, maintaining that children
learn when developing activities through the manipulation of
objects (e.g., Montessori, 1914). To sum up, active participation
during learning, therefore, connects children’s experience more
closely with cognitive processes, thus enriching educational
practices while enhancing learning abilities As proposed by
Jonas (1966), we actively maintain our dynamic identity by
doing, i.e., our self-produced identity is based on action, and on
perception-action patterns that enable constant interchange with
the surroundings. The present study provides new evidence of
how cognition emerges from experiential (enactive) processes,
which contributes to the understanding of how embodied
agency facilitates conceptual processing such as the quantitative
conservation principle. The outcome of this research thus
emphasizes how active participation benefits cognitive processes
in learning contexts, promoting autonomy and agency during
childhood.
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